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CAN FEDERAL SANCTIONS FORCE
STATES TO CLEAN THEIR AIR
MISSOURI V. UNITED STATES1
by Theodore A. Kardis
1. IN1RODUCTION
The Clean Air Act is one of the most
pervasive and complex pieces of envi-
ronmental legislation on the books to-
day. Many states are struggling to meet
its guidelines. Some are facing sanc-
tions for failure to comply, while others
have already felt the sting of EPA's
whip. This non-traditional casenote ex-
plores a pending dispute between the
state of Missouri and the federal govem-
ment over Congress' constitutional
authority to implement the Clean Air Act
vis-a-vis the states.
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When Governor Mel Cornahan
signed Senate Bill 590 into law on June
3, 1994, he not only approved the Air
Quality Attainment Act (AQAA), but also
set a lawsuit into motion. The AQAA
was intended to bring Missouri into com-
pliance with the federal Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, which requires
the implementation of a basic vehicle
inspection and maintenance (I&M) pro-
gram by virtue of St. Louis' classification
as a "moderate" nonantainment area for
ozone.2
The impetus for this legislative action
can be traced to two EPA findings that
cite deficiencies in Missouri's State Im-
plementation Plan (SIP). In January
1993, EPA formally charged Missouri
with failure to submit a revised I&M pro-
gram.' One year later, EPA, again,
brought charges against Missouri. This
time it was due to an incomplete VOC
(volatile organic compound) reduction
plan.4 In order to remedy these deficien-
cies and avoid sanctions, the Legislature
passed S.B. 590, thereby establishing
the AQAA. An amendment to the bill,
however, put a twist on the AQAA's im-
plementation. The terms of the amend-
ment specify that the AQAA shall not
take effect until a particularly described
lawsuit is filed in federal court by the at-
torney general on behalf of the state of
Missouri.5
The amendment, codified at Mo. REv.
STAT. § 643.360, states that the lawsuit
must request injunctive relief and must
challenge the EPA's legal authority to
impose sanctions threatened by the EPA
pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' Specific
allegations for the lawsuit were also sug-
gested, including the general allegation
that the sanctions potentially imposed on
the St. Louis air quality control region by
virtue of its nonattainment status were
unreasonable in relation to the standards
which determined that status.7 Specifi-
cally, the Legislature suggested that sub-
stantial evidence does not exist to relate
St. Louis' air quality to the potential sanc-
tions.8 In support of the allegation that
the standards are arbitrary, the Legisla-
ture set out factual allegations stating
that only one of the seventeen St. Louis
monitoring sites has registered more than
the allowed number of exceedances
over the last three years; and that purely
local causes are responsible for the ex-
ceedances at the one site, thus making it
an inappropriate barometer of St. Louis
air quality.9 In support of the allegation
that the potential sanctions are arbitrary,
the Legislature offered several factual al-
legations, including the existence of lo-
cal causes at the one site registering
exceedances; that Missouri should be
given timeto correct those exceedances;
that the expenditure of $125 million to
cure the exceedances at the one site is
unreasonable; and that the mandatory
15% volatile organic compound (VOC)
emission reduction might unreasonably
require an emission reduction beyond
attainment status.10
The Legislature's suggested allega-
tions took a beating during the summer
of 1994, just after Governor Carnahan
had signed S.B. 590 into law. Of the
I No. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF (E.D.Mo. filed Nov. 4, 1994).
2 See infro notes 2629 and accompanying text.
3 Plaintitfs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3, Missouri v. United States (E.D.Mo.lNo. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Proposed
Findings].
4 Id.
s Mo. REv. SAT. § 643.360 (1994).
6 Id.
7 Id. The amended portion of the statute requires plaintiff to show why the EPA sanctions are unreasonable in relation to the standards by proving: 1) these is no
sufficient evidence of a rational relation between ambient air and the penalties the state is seeking; 2) both the standards and the penalties are arbitrary; 3) the
penalties are arbitrary and unreasonable for other reasons listed in the statute. Id.
I Id. at § 643.360[1).
9 Id. at § 643.360121[a), (211b).
10 Id. at § 643.36013]a-{dl.
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seventeen monitoring stations throughout
the St. Louis area, none can exceed the
maximum VOC level more than three
times during a three year period." By
the end of the summer of 1994, one site
had recorded five violations, another
four, and many others had recorded
two. 12 This means that the St. Louis re-
gion will be upgraded from a
"moderate" nonattainment area to a
"serious" nonattainment area unless no
ozone violations are recorded during
1996.13
Missouri's regulatory woes were fur-
ther complicated by a July 1994 EPA
finding that Missouri's SIP was deficient
in regards to another criteria pollutant,
nitrogen oxides (NO.).i Missouri must
make a SIP revision which incorporates
reasonably available control technology
(RACT) to all major NO. sources in the
St. Louis nonattainment area by February
6, 1996 or face sanctions."
Despite a summer full of exceedances
at several different St. Louis monitoring
sites, the Missouri Attorney General took
its lead from the Legislature and filed the
suggested lawsuit on November 4,
1994.i" The case went to trial on No-
vember 21, although no orders have yet
been issued.' 7 The amendment to the
AQAA provides that the act shall not be
implemented as long as a temporary re-
straining order or injunction is in effect,' 8
however, no restraining order or tempo-
rary injunction was requested based on
the court's agreement to pursue an expe-
dited decision. Nonetheless, as of this
writing no decision has been handed
down, and Missouri's determination not
to seek a preliminary injunction becomes
more significant in the interim preceding
a ruling on the permanent injunction.
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Relevant Clean Air
Act Provisions
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the
EPA to adopt nationally uniform ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS) for crite-
ria air pollutants, one of which is
ozone." The CAA further requires states
to develop and submit state implementa-
tion plans (SIPs) to EPA for approval.2o
The SIP must specify measures to assure
that air quality within the state will meet
the NAAQS. 2' Generally, a SIP must
assign specific emission limitations to
individual sources; establish timetables
for compliance by those sources; set up
procedures to review new sources; es-
tablish systems to monitor air quality;
and provide for enforcement. The
CAA even provides a process for defin-
ing the measures necessary for achieving
the NAAQS: first, inventory emissions
and project expected growth to establish
the extent of the problem; second,
choose control strategies for reducing
emissions; and third, demonstrate that
such measures will be adequate to
achieve the NAAS (e.g. using
modeling).23 Once a SIP has been ap-
proved by the EPA, it is promulgated as
a federal regulation, enforceable by the
public. Moreover, the SIP system is a
dynamic process; most states, including
Missouri, amend their SIPs annually.
While the CAA was enacted in
1970, the 1977 CAA Amendments
were significant in that they separated
the country into areas not yet achieving
the NAAS ("nonattainment" areas),
and areas in which air quality was bet-
ter than the NAAQS (PSDs (for
"Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion")).2' The 1990 CAA Amendments
made significant changes in the nonat-
tainment and PSD programs. Whereas
the nonattainment program established
in 1977 required "reasonable further
progress" but left the term vaguely de-
fined, the 1990 amendments allow the
Administrator to require annual incre-
mental reductions in emissions.25  The
1990 Amendments even established a
series of provisions relating specifically
to ozone nonattainment areas which
classified the areas into "marginal,"
"moderate," "serious," "severe," and
"extreme," and established attainment
deadlines for each.26 As the St. Louis
air quality control region is currently clas-
sified as "moderate" nonottoinment area
for ozone,27 and is at significant risk of
being reclassified as "serious," an over-
view of the mandated measures for each
of these classifications is in order.
" William Allen, Ozone levels Enter Danger Zone Here Area Could Face Federal Sanctions, ST. LouIs PosT DisPATCH, Aug. 21, 1994, at 01D.
12 Id.
12 Id.
14 Plaintiff's Proposed Findings, supra note 3, at 3.
iS Id.
16 Plaintiffs Proposed Findings, supra note 3.
" Fred Lindecke, Trial Over Emissions Tests To Be Closely Watched, ST. LOUs Post DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1994, at 09D
i Mo. REv. Sw. § 643.360.
io 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). Ozone, a criteria pollutant, is used as an indicator for smog. The source pollutant is a group of chemicals known as volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), which react with nitrogen oxides (NO.) to produce smog.




24 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 74707492 (19881lising PSD area requirements); Id. §§ 7501-7508 (listing nonaltainment area requirements).
2 42 U.S.C. § 7501 (Supp. 111990).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-751 Il (Supp. 11 1990).
' Plaintiff's Proposed Findings, supro note 3, at 2. The Si. Louis area was so designated on November 6, 1991. Id.
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If an area has been classified as a
"moderate" nonattainment area, it must
submit to EPA an inventory of actual
emissions from all sources and revise it
every three years; apply a reasonably
available control technology (RACT) pro-
gram to many VOC sources; implement
a vehicle emission control inspection and
maintenance (I&M) program; implement
new source permitting programs; submit
a SIP that will reduce VOCs fifteen per-
cent in six years; and require the installa-
tion of gasoline vapor recovery systems
at gas stations." If an area has been
classified as a "serious" nonattainment
area, it must comply with all "moderate"
area requirements (which incidentally are
partially defined by the "marginal" area
requirements) as well as implement a SIP
with enhanced monitoring; make an
attainment demonstration of the new
SIP's effectiveness to the EPA using mod-
eling or another approved analytical
method; demonstrate a three percent
reduction in baseline emissions each
year, averaged over a three year pe-
riod; implement an enhanced vehicle
I&M program; incorporate a transporta-
tion control program into the SIP; and
revise the SIP to include a clean-fuel vehi-
cle program."
Another crucial provision added by
the 1990 CAA Amendments provides
for sanctions to be levied against the
states for failure to attain the NAAQS. 0
Grounds for sanctions include failure to
submit a SIP for a nonattainment area,
failure to submit a SIP which includes all
the required elements of a nonattainment
SIP for that area and which meets cer-
tain minimum criteria, failure of the SIP
to meet the proscribed nonattainment
elements, failure to make other required
submissions, and failure to implement the
approved SIP." This starts the running
of the "sanctions clock."32  If one of
these grounds exists, the state has eight-
een months to correct the deficiency." If
at that point the deficiency is still not cor-
rected, the EPA must impose one of two
sanctions. 3 However, if there is a lack
of good faith on the part of the state or if
the state is still noncompliant after an ad-
ditional six months, both sanctions will
apply until complianceis achieved.S
There are two sanctions: highway
sanctions and offsets.3 The highway
sanction allows the EPA to cut off federal
funding to the area with the exception of
sofetyrelated projects.3 However, the
EPA has the authority to approve certain
projects which it finds would improve air
quality.3" The offsets sanction would
increase the offset ratio required in new
source permitting to 2:1 ." The EPA has
decided that the offset sanction will ap-
ply eighteen months after the finding of a
deficiency, and the highway sanction six
months after that.o40 While the imposition
of these sanctions is mandatory at the
proscribed intervals, the EPA has the
authority to impose them sooner."
Furthermore, this authority allows the EPA
to expand the sanctions to the entire




The first of Missouri's legal chal-
lenges to the federal government's sanc-
tion authority is based on the Tenth
Amendment, which reads: "[t]he pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by
the constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states re-
spectively, or to the people." 3 The
Tenth Amendment has meant different
things to the Supreme Court at different
times in its history, thus an examination
of the various judicial interpretations of
the Amendment is crucial.
Early Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
seemed to clearly indicate that it did not
constitute a limitation on the congres-
sional exercise of powers delegated by
the Constitution." Later, in the 1930s, it
was used by the Court as one of many
grounds for invalidating New Deal legis-
lation,45 but this practice was soon
abandoned. 6 Insofar as it operated as
a check upon federal power, the Tenth
Amendment laid dormant for a long pe-
riod which ended suddenly with the
modern day Supreme Court decision,
28 42 U.S.C. § 751 lalb) (Supp. II1990); Id. § 751 lola).
" Id.§§7511alaHc).
3 42 U.S.C. § 7509 ISupp. It 1990).
3' Id. § 7509 a).
2 See 40 C.F.R. § 52.31 (1994).
32 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (Supp. 11 19901.
34 Id.
3S Id.
3 Id. § 7509b).
3 Id. § 75091bl1)[A).
3 Id. § 75091bl1113).
3 Id. § 75091b)[2).
40 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(dHI1) (1994).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 74101m) (Supp. It 19901.
42 Id.
' U.S. Cots. amend. X.
U See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (18241; McCulloch v. Mayland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404-07 (1819); and Martin v. Hunter's lessee, I Wheat. 304,
324-25 (1816).
A See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
" See, e.g. NIRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 111937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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National League of Cities v. Usery.Y' In
National league of Cities, the Supreme
Court invalidated portions of the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) as violative of the Tenth
Amendment."8 Specifically, the Court
held that the FLSA amendments
"operate[d] to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral op-
erations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions."49  The Court
recognized that the Tenth Amendment
stood for the proposition that
"...Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integ-
rity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system." 50 The Court held
that the FLSA amendments interfered with
traditional aspects of state sovereignty,
one of which was the substantial costs
imposed upon the states by the amend-
ments.51  However, a four member
dissent vehemently opposed the con-
cepithat the Tenth Amendment places
independent limits on federal power,
calling it an "ill-conceived
abstraction. 52
The position of the National League
of Cities dissent would ultimately win out
nearly a decade later, but in the mean-
time the Court continued to refine its new
found application of the Tenth Amend-
ment. A particularly important decision
is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc. s Hodel
involved a Tenth Amendment challenge
to the Surface Mining Control and Reclo-
motion Act." Although the Court did
not find that the legislation was invalid, it
set forth and applied three requirements
for a successful Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge.ss The first requirement is a
"showing that the challenged statute
regulates the 'States as States."' 56 The
second requires that "the federal regula-
tion must address matters that are indis-
putably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' 57 The third requirement is
that "it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability 'to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions. "'5 The Court
applied this test in a few subsequent de-
cisions,S9 until the Tenth Amendment tide
turned in 1985.
The vacillation of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence continued when the Su-
preme Court overruled National League
of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropoliton Transit Authority.'o The Court
rejected the prior analysis of whether a
particular state governmental function
was "integral" or "traditional". 61 In de-
ciding to overrule precedent, the Court
seemed frustrated with the application of
the doctrine first put forward by National
League of Cities. It noted that while
National League of Cities had attempted
to use the Tenth Amendment to place a
limit on Congress' power, articulating
this limit "in terms of core governmental
functions and fundamental attributes of
state sovereignty," that doctrine had
"underestimated ... the solicitude of the
national political process for the contin-
ued vitality of the States."'62
The Court concluded that the National
League of Cities model was unneces-
sary, "impracticable," and "doctrinally
barren.",6  However, a four justice dis-
sent, composed of the remaining mem-
bers of the National League of Cities
majority, decried the abandonment of its
model and pronounced that Garcia
"effectively reduces the Tenth Amend-
ment to meaningless rhetoric...."6
In the wake of Garcia, it seemed as
though the Tenth Amendment imposed
no restrictions on Congress regulating
the states as states. However, the Court
would define some limits on Congres-
sional power in New York v. United
States." Interestingly, the Court again
visited the Tenth Amendment in the con-
text of a challenge to environmental leg-
islation, this time the Low-level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act."6 Re-
sponding to speculation over the demise
of the Tenth Amendment, the Court ex-
plained that while it does indeed restrain
the power of Congress, the limitation
does not spring directly from the text of
the amendment, which is simply a
"tautology."67 Rather, as the Court
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id.
Id. of 852.
Id. al 842-34 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
Id. of 845-46.
Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 287 (quoting National league of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
Id. at 287-88 (quoting Notional league of Ciies, 426 U.S. at 845).
Id. at 288 (quoting National league of Cies at 852).
See United Transportation Union v. Long Island RR. Co., 455 U.S. 678 119821; EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226(19831.




Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Actually, Justice Blackmun, who concurred in Naional league of Cities, defected to write the majority opinion in Garcia.
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elucidated, it "confirms that the power of
the Federal Government is subject to lim-
its that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the states."" More specifi-
cally, the Court characterized the issue
before it as "whether Congress may di-
rect or otherwise motivate the States to
regulate in a particular field or in a par-
ticular way."6 The Court proceeded to
identify the principles which guided such
an inquiry.
In identifying the first such principle,
the Court resurrected the utility of Hodel,
a pre-Garcia decision, by citing its lan-
guage: "Congress may not simply
'commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regula-
tory program."' 70 The other major prin-
ciple identified by the Court is that
Congress, using methods "short of out-
right coercion," may "encourage a State
to regulate in a particular way...."7
One such method, better discussed un-
der the Spending Clause, is the attach-
ment of conditions to the receipt of
federal funds.72 The other constitution-
ally permissible method is offering states
the "choice of regulating that activity ac-
cording to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal
regulation."
The Court actually invalidated one of
the provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act using this
Tenth Amendment analysis. The Court
held that the "take title" provision of the
Act, which forced states to make a
"choice" (sarcasm is the Court's) be-
tween accepting ownership of radioac-
tive waste and regulating according to
Congress' instructions, had crossed the
line between encouragement and coer-
cion. Accordingly, the Court severed
the provision from the rest of the Act
since it infringed on the state sovereignty
harbored by the Tenth Amendment. 7s
While the Court has returned to a nar-
rowly defined interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment's limitation on Congression-
alpower, the vacillation may not yet be
over. As Chief Justice Rehnquist bra-
zenly put it, National League of Cities
"will, I am confident, in time again com-
mand the support of a majority of this
Court." 76
2. Spending Clause
The second of Missouri's legal chal-
lenges to the federal government's sanc-
tion authority is based on the Spending
Clause, which reads: "The Congress
shall have power: [t]o lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts
and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States; .....""7 The question of
whether Congress can use its spending
power to indirectly induce states to regu-
late has received much treatment by the
Court this century. Generally speaking,
the Court has answered this question in
the offirmative.78
In particular, the Court has held that
"Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds,"' and that
these conditions can influence the legis-
lative choices of states.80 In New York,
the Court refined these pronouncements,
stating that "[sluch conditions must
(among other requirements) bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending."i The Court gave the ration-
ale for this rule, explaining that without
it, the spending powercould "render
academic the Constitution's other grants
and limits of federal authority."82  The
New York Court went on to restate the
other limitations on the spending power:
that the expenditure be for the general
welfare;83 that the conditions to receipt
must be unambiguous;" and that the
conditions must not violate any inde-
pendent constitutional prohibition."
IV. SUMM4ARY OF PARTY POSIONS
A. Missouri
Missouri asserts that the l&M pro-
gram will be costly and furthermore that
the residents of Missouri will blame their
67 Id. at 24 18.
" Id.
69 Id. of 2420.
" Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
7' Id. at 2423.
"~ Id.
n Id. of 2424.
74 Id. of 2428.
n Id. of 2429, 2434.
76 Garcia 469 U.S. a0 580 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
7 U.S. CONs?, cut. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478-80 (1980); Massachusels v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 568-69 (1974); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947).
" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206(19781. Interestingly, Dole concerned Congress' authority to withhold Federal highway funds from slates that refused
to raise their drinking age to 21. The Court did not find this to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' spending power.
*0 New York, 112 S.C. at 2423.
at Id.
32 Id.
93 Id. at 2426; see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 64041 (1937).
" Id.; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427-31 (1946).
a Id.; see also Lawrence County v. LeadDeadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
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State elected officials rather than the fed-
eral government for the consequences of
the I&M program.86 Missouri also ob-
serves that it is faced with impending
sanctions on several grounds.87 Further-
more, Missouri alleges that it has spent
large sums of money in order to elude
sanctions." In support of its request for
an injunction, Missouri argues that
should the EPA impose the offset sanc-
tion on the St. Louis nonattainment area,
it would preclude future economic devel-
opment in that area." According to
Missouri, the offset sanction surpasses
permissible encouragement orinduce-
ment and amounts to an unconstitutional
coercion, the faux "choice" prohibited
by New York." Specifically, Missouri
contends that the offset sanction violates
the Tenth Amendment.91 Irrespective of
the Hobson's choice posed by the offset
sanction, Missouri avers that the sanction
would decrease air quality, thus having
on effect counter to its purpose.92
With regard to the highway sanc-
tion, Missouri makes the intuitive assump-
tion that it will lose funding for many of
its highway construction projects if the
sanction is imposed, thus bringing many
of these projects to a standstill.93 Mis-
souri asserts that the effect of this will
spread from St. Louis to all of Missouri in
the form of unemployment as well as de-
creases in gross regional product, per-
sonal income, and population.94
Missouri makes the same New York faux
choice argument in response to these
adverse effects, contending that they
bring about an unconstitutional coercion
to regulate under the Clean Air Act as
they are directed to by Congress.9s Mis-
souri urges that the punitive nature of the
highway sanction, which could poten-
tially cut off all of Missouri's highway
funding, rises beyond the Congressional
inducement permitted by New York to
the level of unconstitutional coercion.96
Thus, Missouri concludes that the high-
way sanction also violates the Tenth
Amendment.97 In addition to making the
Tenth Amendment argument, Missouri
also challenges the highway sanction
based on the Spending Clause. Mis-
souri asserts that its conditional receipt of
federal funds for its highways, based on
its implementation of the federal govern-
ment's CAA regulatoryscheme, is not
rationally related to any purpose of fed-
eral highway funding." Missouri con-
cludes that this is a violation of the
Spending Clause, as interpreted by
New York."9 Peripherally, it also at-
tempts to demonstrate the folly of the
sanctions: that the highway sanction
would lead to traffic congestion and in-
creased auto emissions, thereby having
a counterproductive effect on air
quality.'tm
Finally, in order to satisfy the ele-
ments necessary for an injunction, Mis-
souri alleges that it will suffer irreparable
injury in the form of pecuniary loss and
diverted human resources unless the
highway and offset sanctions are both
enjoined, and that no adequate remedy
exists at low for these injuries.101
B. The United States
Missouri complained that the I&M
program would be costly to the states
and its citizens, thereby resulting in politi-
cal fallout. The United States responded
to this complaint by pointing to the fact
that Missouri chose to shoulder an un-
necessary burden by opting to purchase
real estate, buildings, and equipment to
conduct the program itself instead of pri-
vatizing it, a cost not required by the
CAA."2 As to Missouri's claim that the
offset sanction would preclude economic
development in the St. Louis nonattain-
ment area, the United States pointed out
that the sanction only applies to new
VOC and NO. sources or such sources
which are seeking a major modification,
concluding that Missouri's assumption
that all VOC and NO. sources will be
affected makes its economic impact as-
sessment unreasonable.103  Furthermore,
the United States explains that even with
the imposition of sanctions, Missouri
couldstill promote economic expansion;
major sources could "net out" by de-
creasing emissions elsewhere at a single
plant; Missouri could seek approval for
relaxation of its "dual source" definition,
which would release some sources from
the offset requirement; and Missouri
6 Plainfiffs Proposed Findings at 4, Missouri (No. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF).
* Id.
8o Id. at 6.
e Id. at 4.
90 Id. at 4-5, 7.
91 Id. at 8.
9 Id. o 5.
9 Id.
9 Id.
s id. o 5-6.
9 Id. of 6.
9 Id. at 7.
9 Id. of 6.
9 Id. at 7.
11 Id. of 5.
1or Id. at 7-8.
10 Defendant's Proposed Findings of Foci and Conclusions of Low of 18-19, Missouri v. United States (E.D.Mo.llNo. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF) (hereinafter 'Defendants
Proposed Findlings').
10 Id. at 25.
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could also use some of its VOC emission
credits to attract new sources)" The
United States contends that the eco-
nomic impact of any sanctions could be
further diminished if existing sources took
advantage of the many ways to "avoid"
offset requirements.ios In addition, the
United States observed that many
sources of economic growth do not en-
tail the production of ozone precursors,
and would not, therefore, be affected by
an offset sanction. 06
The United States argued that the im-
position of either the highway or offset
sanctions would not violate the Tenth
Amendment.' 7 In taking this position,
the United States suggested that Mis-
souri's claims that the sanctions would
adversely affect its economy are legally
irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment in-
quiry.io8 Rather, the United States ar-
gues that New York allows it to
encourage particular regulation by the
states through the use of incentives, and
that it has not taken the impermissible
step of directly compelling state imple-
mentation of a federal regulatory pro-
gram.i 09 Furthermore, the United States
flatly denies Missouri's argument that it
has been given an unconstitutionally co-
ercive choice."o The United States ex-
pands on this denial by asserting that
while Missouri's choice is a difficult one,
neither alternative is unconstitutional
since Congress can both impose lighter
limits on the dispensation of highway
funds and dictate more rigid pollution
controls.'
The United States addressed
Missouri's contentions that offset sanc-
tions would decrease air quality and that
highway sanctions would lead to con-
gestion and decreased air quality in
much the same manner. It attacked the
offsetl12 and highway"" counterproduc-
tive sanction arguments by characteriz-
ing them as unsupported and unrealistic
assumptions derived from flowed
methodology.
Finally, the United States addressed
Missouri's argument that the highway
sanctions (not the offset sanctions) vio-
lated the Spending Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Essentially, the United
States contended that it met the New
York requirement that there be "some
relationship" between the condition of
implementation of federally mandated
regulation and the purposes of the condi-
tional highway funding." 4  The United
States identified this relationship as be-
ing between the objective of reducing
air pollution from cars via encouraging
state implementation of I&M programs
and the inherent effect of increased vehi-
cle use and pollution stemming as a
product from federallyfunded highway
construction.IIs
V. COMMENT
A consideration of the objectives of
the parties involved in this lawsuit is cen-
tral to on understanding of what the fu-
ture may hold for the St. Louis
nonattainment area as well as other
states with air quality control regions ex-
periencing nonattainment problems.
Missouri's case was considerably
stronger from an equitable standpoint
before the multiple exceedances which
occurred in the summer of 1994. The
statutory allegation that the potential
sanctions were arbitrary, due to the fact
that only one site had recorded more
than one exceedance prior to the sum-
mer of 1994, made the CAA appear
quite draconian. However, due to the
number of exceedances over the sum-
mer, that allegation no longer had a fac-
tual basis and was excluded from the
actual suit. This left Missouri with a pair
of tenuous arguments, one based on the
Tenth Amendment, the other on the
Spending Clause. Quite simply, Mis-
souri was forced to prosecute the lawsuit
by its Legislature before it could imple-
ment the l&M program. Facing a round
of sanctions, it had no choice but to at-
tempt the challenge.
However, the challenge has held up
the implementation of the enhanced l&M
program. Timing is crucial, since St.
Louis faces reclassification as a "serious"
nonattainment area unless it can better
control VOC and NO. emissions. It is
ironic that both sides agree that the l&M
program is the most effective and effi-
cient way to do so.1 16 In fact, the Mis-
souri DNR has estimated that the l&M
program alone can take St. Louis nearly
halfway to its required emission
reduction."' 7
If this is the case, why is Missouri
dragging its feet by prosecuting this law-
suit? Based on the multiple exceedances
in 1994, there is no reason to believe
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silent this summer when no significant
emissions reduction measures have been
undertaken. Obviously, the I&M pro-
gram should be implemented immedi-
ately if St. Louis is to have any chance of
avoiding reclassification as a "serious"
nonattainment area. Nothing prevents
Missouri from implementing the l&M pro-
gram while it awaits the outcome of the
suit requesting the injunction. If it ex-
pends a significant amount of funds start-
ing up the program and wins the
injunction suit in the meantime, it could
easily pursue a damages remedy at a
later date.
The rhetoric in Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings about the political conse-
quences of the difficult choice Missouri is
faced with seems out of place, at best.
"Missouri's" concern that their state gov-
ernment will be held politically account-
able for either the costly and
controversial l&M program or the harsh
sanctions which would follow from fail-
ing to implement it is self-interested and
completely irrelevant to the Constitutional
inquiry before the court. This is not to
say that there are no relevant considera-
lions flowing from the choice between
federally mandated state regulation and
sanctions, but only that the political con-
sequences do not concern the real party
in interest, Missouri.
Missouri's Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge is a colorable one, although it cer-
tainly would have stood a better chance
under National League of Cities than
under the current standards set forth in
New York. With National League of
Cities, the Tenth Amendment was revital-
ized as a check on Congressional
power running roughshod over state sov-
ereignty. Certainly Missouri would
rather be arguing that compliance with
the CAA would impair its ability to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. However,
after Garcia overruled National League
of Cities, Missouri is left with the nearly
insurmountable task of convincing a
New York-era court that both of its
"choices" are unconstitutional. The fed-
eral government's power to set environ-
mental compliance standards and
encourage states to adopt them using
the highway funds carrot is compelling
and appears uncontroverted, especially
now that the Tenth Amendment has re-
turned to its dormant state. Since Con-
gress chose an indirect method of
inducing states to participate in the
CAA, this is the only part of New York
that Missouri can hang its hat on. Per-
haps the Republican Congress or a Su-
preme Court which has returned the
reins to Chief Justice Rehnquist will come
to Missouri's rescue. Moreover, Mis-
souri is not the only state to voice its con-
cerns in court - Virginia has brought a
declaratory judgment action which is
currently under consideration by the
Fourth Circuit which raises both of the
constitutional challenges put forward by
Missouri." It would seem as though
Missouri will have a hard time beating
Virginia to the Supreme Court if the
Court is eager to grant certiorari on this
issue.
Returning to the instant case, the
Spending Clause challenge probably
has a lesser probability of success than
the Tenth Amendment argument. As a
check on Congressional power, the
Spending Clause is even weaker than
the hibernating Tenth Amendment. Fac-
ing a rather static standard, it will be
hard for Missouri to win the argument
that compliance with the CAA is totally
unrelated to the purpose of federal high-
way funding.
All of this leaves Missouri with a de-
layed start on its enhanced l&M pro-
gram, a program which could help pull
St. Louis out of the nonatlainment hole it
has fallen into. For if it is not imple-
mented soon, Missouri is only looking at
the beginning of its SIP and sanction
problems; reclassification to a "serious"
nonattainment area is imminent.
VI. CONCLUSION
As more and more states experience
CAA compliance difficulties, public at-
tention is sure to be focused on the act
by the lenses of sanctions and increas-
ingly invasive regulation. Although con-
stitutional challenges to the federal
government's authority to impose sanc-
tions as well as strict environmental stan-
dards are not likely to meet with success
in the courts under the law as it stands
today, times change. The continuously
vacillating Tenth Amendment could
swing into another active phase. The
combination of a Republican Congress
and President could sign unfunded man-
dates legislation that would placate the
states with federal funding or decreased
regulation. Clean Air Act reauthoriza-
tion could weaken its regulatory effective-
ness. Only time will tell whether the
Clean Air Act will deliver what its title
promises.
"a Virginio v. United States, 74 F.3d 517 (41h Cir. 1996).
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